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## CONTENTS

### Papers

<i>Danskin, J.M.</i> : Fictitious Play for Continuous Games Revisited. . . . .	147
<i>Flanigan, J.A.</i> : Selective Sums of Loopy Partizan Graph Games . . . . .	1
<i>Kim, K.H.</i> , and <i>F.W. Roush</i> : Properties of Consistent Voting Systems. . . . .	45
<i>Kreps, V.L.</i> : Finite $N$ -person Non-cooperative Games with Unique Equilibrium Points . . . . .	125
<i>Mertens, J.-F.</i> , and <i>A. Neyman</i> : Stochastic Games . . . . .	53
<i>Michener, H.A.</i> , <i>K. Yuen</i> , and <i>M.M. Sakurai</i> : On the Comparative Accuracy of Lexicographical Solutions in Cooperative Games . . . . .	75
<i>Morris, F.L.</i> : Playing Disjunctive Sums is Polynomial Space Complete. . . . .	195
<i>Okada, A.</i> : On Stability of Perfect Equilibrium Points. . . . .	67
<i>Okada, A.</i> : A Note on the Perfectness Concept and the Information Structures of Games . . . . .	133
<i>Packel, E.W.</i> : Semisimple Games, Enactment Power and Generalized Power Indices. . . . .	137
<i>Peleg, B.</i> : Coalition Formation in Simple Games with Dominant Players . . . . .	11
<i>Perles, M.A.</i> , and <i>M. Maschler</i> : The Super-Additive Solution for the Nash Bargaining Game . . . . .	163
<i>Pitchik, C.</i> : Equilibria of a Two-Person Non-Zerosum Noisy Game of Timing. . . . .	207
<i>Rabie, M.A.</i> : A Note on the Exact Games . . . . .	131
<i>Ruckle, W.H.</i> : Pursuit on a Cyclic Graph — The Symmetric Stochastic Case . . . . .	91
<i>Sharkey, W.W.</i> : Convex Games Without Side Payments . . . . .	101
<i>Shilony, Y.</i> : More on Spatial Oligopoly as a Noncooperative Game . . . . .	117
<i>Straffin, P.D.</i> , and <i>J.P. Heaney</i> : Game Theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority . . . . .	35
<i>Tauman, Y.</i> : Value on a Class of Non-Differentiable Market Games . . . . .	155
<i>Thomson, W.</i> : Independence of Irrelevant Expansions. . . . .	107

### Listing Service

<i>Brams, St.J.</i> , and <i>D. Wittmann</i> : Nonmyopic Equilibria. . . . .	115
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